Secret Service scandal in the US: Protection protocols have not been updated for 35 years.

The report published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that the U.S. Secret Service has not updated some of its core practices concerning the security of the president and high‑ranking officials traveling abroad for years.

According to the report, the agency’s main protection guidelines used in this regard have not been comprehensively revised since 1991. The findings emerged during a period when oversight of the agency increased after assassination attempts on Donald Trump and security measures taken at international summits.

The Protection Guide That Has Stood Unchanged for 34 Years

The GAO report stated that the Secret Service’s core guidelines for protecting the president and other high‑ranking officials traveling abroad have not been updated since 1991.

After last year’s assassination attempt on Trump, the agency’s security practices began to be scrutinized more closely, and the measures implemented after the NATO summit also became a point of debate.

Following the NATO meeting held in Turkey, Trump’s need to use a different aircraft instead of Air Force One for security reasons heightened doubts about the currency of protection procedures.

Old Methods Against UAV Threats

In the investigations carried out by Congress, it was determined that the Secret Service had continued to use old methods for a long time in countering threats to unmanned aerial vehicles, and that necessary technical updates were not implemented on time.

According to the GAO's report, 83 incidents between 2015 and 2025 disrupted normal protection activities. However, changes to the relevant policy or practice were made only after 25 of those incidents.

This situation strengthened criticisms that the agency had not translated the lessons from the security incidents into its procedures quickly enough.

They Lack Complete Information

GAO also emphasized in its report that the Secret Service lacks a systematic evaluation mechanism for policy changes following incidents.

The report stated that after security incidents, policies were often not updated and there was no system requiring staff to document the reasons why existing practices continued to be maintained.

Thus, it was stated that the institution could not have all the necessary information while updating its protection policies.

The Secret Service's own internal regulations provisioned for new procedures to be reviewed within four years, yet it was recorded that this condition had also not been regularly applied for a long time.

They Were Removed from the Investigation Scope

Following the report's publication, a notable development unfolded within the GAO. The office placed the institution spokesperson and two officials on administrative leave as part of an abuse‑of‑power investigation.

The decision is viewed as being connected to the procedural debates noted during the report's preparation and publication.